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THE STATUS OF LABOR UNIONS UNDER THE
SHERMAN LAW
In Dowd vs. United Mine Workers et al,1 the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holds, on demurrer, that a labor union
is liable to be sued in its own name under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law of 1890.2 Although it is well settled that labor organizations are
subject to the act,3 this is the first decision holding that such unin-
corporated associations may be sued by name. The importance of
the ruling lies in the fact that it more readily subjects union funds to
execution for the torts of union members.
The legal status of trade unions has always been the subject of
controversy. In England, from the time of Francis Place and the
Combination Laws of 1825 to the, Taff Vale case 4 and the Osborne
judgment,5 judicial decisions on the status of trade unions have been
followed by political agitation and legislation. It is therefore of some
interest to find the Circuit Court of Appeals handing down a decision
very similar to the historic Taff Vale case, which, with Quinn vs.
Leatheirn,6 resulted in the election of fifty-four labor members to Par-
liament in 1905 and the subsequent passage of the Trades Dispute
Act of 1906.7 The two decisions serve to illustrate, incidentally, some
marked differences between the status of unions in England and in
this country.
Both in reason and on authority the ruling in the principal case
appears doubtful. In interpreting the Sherman Law the court (Car-
land, J.), follows the Taff Vale case, holding that, although a union
is neither a natural or artificial person, "there is a clear and necessary
implication that the association may be sued in its own name; other-
wise the provision that the association should be liable could not be
enforced." Coming after a rigorous execution under a judgment for
some $250,000 against the savings accounts of the Danbury Hatters,8
1235 Fed. 1.
2 CoMp. Stat. 1913, 8830.
3 Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans vs. U. S., 54
Fed. 994; Affd. in 57 Fed. 85; In re Debs, 64 Fed. 724; Aft. in 158 U. S. 564;
Loewe vs. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274; Lawlor vs. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522; Water-
house vs. Comer, 55 Fed. 149; U. S. vs. Eliot, 64 Fed. 27.
4 (1901) A. C. 426.5 Amalgamated Society vs. Osborne (1910) A. C. 87.
6 (1901) A. C. 87.
16 Edw. VII, c. 47.
sLavlor vs. Loewe, sugpra.
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the latter ground seems somewhat unsound. It is also clear that the
Taff Vale case is not in point. That case involved a narrow question
of statutory construction under the Trade Union Acts of 1871 9 and
1876,10 This legislation gave unions the exclusive right to a registered
name, allowed them the right to hold property, and regulated their
finances. It was accordingly held in the Taff Vale decision that "the
registered name is nothing more than collective name for all the
members." "1 A similar decision is found in Ohio under similar state
statutes."' But the Sherman Act in no way registers or confers upon
trade unions such "characteristics of incorporation." 13 There is no
room for the prinicple "Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus,"
upon which the Taff Vale case was decided.1 4 Unionists would hardly
call the Sherman Act a "commodum." We may therefore conclude
that the grounds for the present decision are rather slender.
Although it is undoubtedly true that the importance of the de-
cision in the Taff Vale case was magnified, 5 nevertheless it is clear
that the question of parties defendant in suits against trade unions
touches the interests of litigants very closely. To the capitalists it
is a question of indemnity; to the labor union, one of protection of
funds. That the present case has considerable effect is clear from a
brief consideration of the rules of joinder of parties in the case of
so-called voluntary unincorporated associations.
The rule that tort feasors are themselves primarily liable is gen-
erally of no advantage in trade union cases on account of the financial
irresponsibility of the members. Similarly, where trade union prop-
erty is held in trust, the rule that trust property is primarily liable for
obligations incurred by the trustees within the scope of their author-
ity,16 has little application to tort actions. It is therefore a question
of reaching the funds of the union such as strike funds or benefit
funds. The invariable rule that at common law an unincorporated
association, being neither a natural or artificial person, could not be
34 and 35 Vict. c. 31.
VI 39 and 40 Vict. c. 22.
" Lord Macnaghten, p. 439.
12 Hilenbrand vs. Trades Council, 14 Ohio N. P. 628.
Is Webb, in History of Trade Unionism, Introduction XXI.
14 Farwell, J., at p. 430.
15 See F. H. Cooke in Common's Trade Unionism and Labor Problems,
p. 144,
16 Bushong vs. Taylor, 82 Mo. 660; Kerrison vs. Stewart, 93 U. S. 155, 160.
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sued as such, either in law17 or in equity,18 leaves three methods of
reaching associations funds. (1) By joining all the members in an
action at law; or, where the property is held in trust,"9 by creditors'
bill joining all the cestuis qui trustent. (2) By using representative
members in a civil action under the codes, whether the action be legal
or equitable in nature. (3) By suing the association by name under
special statute, or "statutory implication."
The first of these methods is almost universally abandoned, because
of the numerousness of the parties, the difficulty of getting their
names, and the probability of abatement by death.
The second method is of frequent application in injunction cases.2 0
But the cases where unions and associations have been sued for dam-
ages, by joining representative members defendant are apparently
rare. An excellent example of this procedure under the codes is the
Nevada case of Branson vs. L WV. IW.,21 where it was held that a judg-
ment for damages could be had against a trade union sued by repre-
sentative members, and that an affidavit of attachment, good against
the members sued, was also good against the union as such. Why this
method of suit has not been more frequently adopted under the equity
rule of the codes is difficult to understand. It is perhaps more expen-
sive because of the necessity of joining a representative number of
members. And the infrequency of its use may be due in part to the
uncertainty of the equity rule on the matter. The general rule in
equity has always been that all persons whose interest would be affected
by the decree must be before the court.22 And it lies within the dis-
cretion of the court to allow exception to the rule on account of
numerousness of the parties. Lord Eldon's dictum in Adair vs. New
River Co. (1805)" is frequently cited on this point. In an action
against representative members of a joint stock company he held that
a plea of non-joinder was bad, declaring that suit against represen-
tatives is allowable where it is "actually impracticable to bring in all
17 St. Paul Typothetae vs. St. Paul Book Binders' Union, 94 Minn. 351.
1s Pickett vs. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572; American Steel & Wire Co. vs. Die
Makers' Union, 90 Fed. 598.
19 A voluntarr association as such cannot hold realty. Douthitt vs. Stim-
son, 73 Mo. 199, Bacon, Benefit Societies, p. 51.20 Franklin Union No. 4 vs. People, 220 Ill. 355; Flannery vs. People, 225
IIl. 62; Iron Molders vs. Allis Chalmers, 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A.).
2195 Pac. 354.
22 Pom. Eq. Rem. Sec. 891; Perry on Trusts, Sec. 891; Willats vs. Busby,
5 Beav. 193.
2 11 Ves. Jr., 424, 444.
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parties or where it is attended with inconvenience almost amounting
to that" But he adds, "It must depend upon the circumstances in each
case." Meux vs. Maltby"' is the leading case on this point, and purports
to collect all the early authorities. A close examination of these shows,
however, that very few are directly in point, 25 and perhaps explains
some of the uncertainty in the law. In spite of this uncertainty, the
use of this procedure will probably become more frequent under the
codes. Suit by representative parties plaintiff is, of course, of much
greater frequency, being of everyday occurrence in foreclosure cases.
The third method of reaching the assets of an unincorporated
association is entirely statutory. The type of statute that allows such
associations to be sued in their own name was recently adopted in
Missouri.2" Another type is the New York statute,27 allowing unions
to be sued by designated officers. Organized labor looks upon these
statutes with great disfavor. An interesting case where the validity
of such statutes was in issue is found in Michigan,28 in which it
was decided that the statute was not class legislation, nor an attempt
to create a new entity, but a mere matter of remedy. This statutory
method is practically the same as the procedure allowed by implica-
tion in the decision under discussion, and it is probable that organized
labor will look upon the decision in the principal case with the same
disfavor as in the case of the statutes.
It is, therefore, clear that the facilitation of reaching the funds
of trade unions under this decision is of more than technical signi-
ficance. Of course, we need expect no such reaction as followed the
Taff Vale case in England. The present ruling is restricted to actions
under the Sherman Law, and in addition, the peculiar financial man-
agement of American unions makes the decision of less importance
than the British ruling :29 There are few unions in this country except
212 Swanst. 284 (1818).
2' The cases are either against trustees charged with the duty of defend-
ing such suits, or else they turn upon the ordinary principles of agent's lia-
bility. City of London vs. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421, (1701) ; Quintine vs. Yard,
1 Eq. Ca Abr. 74, 1702, (necessary party non-resident); Vernon vs. Blackerby,
2Atk. 144, 1740, citing the Case of the Bubble, (1702) ; Horsley vs. Bell, Amb.
774, (agency case); Cullen vs. Duke of Queensberry, 1 Bro. Ch. 101, (1781);
Cousins vs. Smith, 13 Ves. 544.26 Laws of Mo. 1915, p. 225, amending Sec. 1760 R. S.
27 Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1919, See Curran vs. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33.
2 U. S. Heater Co. vs. Iron Molders' Union, 129 Mich. 354.
" Kennedy: Beneficiary Features of American Trade Unions, XXVI
Johns Hopkins' Studies, p. 18; Sakolski: Trade Union Finance, XXIV Johns
Hopkins' Studies, p. 72.
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the Railroad Brotherhoods, the Typographical, and the Tobacco Work-
ers, which have extensive centralized benefit funds, whereas the bene-
fit system is universal in England, in spite of the national insurance acts.
The decision will possibly serve to stimulate legislation such as
that attempted in the equivocal Clayton Act. 0 Or it may furnish
an argument for the exponents of incorporation for trade unions. As
to incorporation, it is doubtful whether it will ever commend itself
to unions, on account of the inflexibility of membership rules.31 And
with regard to legislation exempting labor organizations from the
penalties of the law, probably a more direct method of benefiting trade
unions would be to change certain rules of the substantive law.
R. W. C.
a°38 Stat. 7.31, Sec. 6, Compare, Harvey & Bradford, Fed. Tr. Comm.
Manual, p. 169, and Judson on Interstate Commerce, 184, for interpretation
of the act.32 See Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problems, p. 140.
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